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I. OBJECTIVES OF AIA IPR POST-GRANT PROCEEDINGS
Congress' objectives of the American Invents Act (AIA) post-
grant proceedings were discussed in detail in the legislative history,
and those objectives included a faster and cheaper alternative to
district court litigation. For example, Senator Hatch (R-Utah),
speaking in support of passing the AIA, highlighted that the new post-
grant proceedings would be less expensive than district court
litigation:
These changes alone will decrease litigation costs so that
small companies and individuals will not be dissuaded from
protecting their patent rights by companies with greater
resources .
3
In an earlier incarnation of patent reform legislation, then-
Senator Kyl emphasized protection of patent owners and inability of
infringers to use post-grant review as a litigation or delaying tactic:
4
Section 5 of the bill authorizes the creation of post grant
review proceedings for challenging the validity of patents.
It allows both first- and second-window review of a patent,
with procedural restrictions that will limit the time and
expense of these proceedings and protect patent owners.
The bill uses a procedural model that is favored by PTO
and is calculated to allow quick resolution of petitions.
Importantly, the bill also imposes procedural limits on
when a second-window proceeding may be sought after
civil litigation has commenced, and restricts duplicative or
second and successive proceedings, preventing infringers
from using post grant review as a litigation or delaying
tactic . . . the bill uses an oppositional model, which is
favored by PTO as allowing speedier adjudication of
3 157 CONG. REc. S5411 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
4 See infra Article 7, Jonathan Stroud, Linda Thayer, and Jeffrey C. Totten, Stay
Awhile: The Evolving Law of District Court Stays in Light of Inter Partes Review,
Post-Grant Review, and Covered Business Method Post-Grant Review.
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claims.5
Many features of the AIA post-grant proceedings reflect the
objectives of faster, less expensive resolution. These include restricted
discovery (compared to district court litigation), statutory time limits,
litigation time limits, and one level of appeal.6
A. "Speedy, inexpensive, andjust" alternative to district court
litigation
When developing the rules to implement the AIA, the USPTO
was directed by statute to "consider the effect of any such regulation
on the economy, the integrity of the patent system, the efficient
administration of the Office, and the ability of the Office to timely
complete proceedings instituted under this chapter.",7  This is
manifested in USPTO Rule 42.1(b): "[t]his part shall be construed to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every
proceeding."8
This rule is found in the Patent Trial and Appeal Board
("PTAB") Final Rules,9 so it is applicable to all PTAB proceedings. It
is also under a subheading of "Policy," indicating that it is broad
directive. Further, the Office Trial and Practice Guide states: "[t]he
rules are to be construed so as to ensure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive resolution of a proceeding and, where appropriate, the
rules may be modified to accomplish these goals."10
As an "alternative" to district court litigation, the statute
includes some mandatory stay provisions, and additionally the
legislative history indicates that Congress "expected that district
judges will liberally grant stays of litigation once a proceeding is
instituted."'1 This has been born out somewhat in a stay grant rate of
60% (253/422) (national average - varies significantly by district
court).
12
5 154 CONG. REC. S9986-87 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
6 157 CONG. REC. S1376 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kohl).
7 35 U.S.C. § 316(b) (2012); 35 U.S.C. §326(b) (2012).
8 Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 77 Fed.
Reg. 48,612 (Aug. 14, 2012).
9 Id.
10 Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48, 758 (Aug. 14,
2012).
11 157 CONG. REC. S1379 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
12 LegalMetric Report, Stay Pending Inter Partes Review (Aug. 2012 - May2015)
(if granted-in-part is included, the percentage is 63 (265/422). LegalMetric statistic is
comparable to other databases, see also, DocketNavigator noting stay rate for 2015 is
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B. Provide a faster administrative challenge route than
reexamination
Senator Kyl supported the AIA post-grant proceedings because
"[l]engthy and duplicative proceedings are one of the worst evils of
other systems of administrative review of patents."
'13
There is no statutory time limit on ex parte reexaminations. The
average time from request to certificate in ex parte reexamination in
the USPTO currently is over two years.14  The old inter partes
reexamination average was over 3 years.'5 In contrast, the AIA post-
grant proceedings, by statute, must be finished within 12 months from
the date of institution (or 18 months for good cause shown).b So far,
PTAB has been meeting the 12-month from institution deadline.
Senator Kyl noted the procedural restrictions that would
facilitate the faster resolution of the AIA post-grant proceedings:
Among the reforms that are expected to expedite these
proceedings are the shift from an examinational to an
adjudicative model, and the elevated threshold for
instituting proceedings. The elevated threshold will require
challengers to front load their case. Also, by requiring
petitioners to tie their challenges to particular validity
arguments against particular claims, the new threshold will
prevent challenges from "mushrooming" after the review
is instituted into additional arguments employing other
prior art or attacking other claims.17
63).
154 CONG. REC. 9988 (2008) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
14 USPTO, Ex PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA - SEPTEMBER 30, 2013,
available at
www.uspto.gov/patents/stats/ex-partehistorical-statsroll-up-EOY2013.pdf
[http://perma.cc/28AL-2HWA] (June 1, 1981 - Sept. 30, 2013 average: 27.8 months).
I USPTO, INTER PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA - SEPTEMBER 30, 2013,
available at
www.uspto.gov/patents/stats/inter.parte-historicalstatsroll-up-EOY2013.pdf
[http://perma.cc7K6J-4P9Y] (Nov. 29, 1999 - Sept. 30, 2013 average: 39.5 months).
16 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) ("requiring that the final determination in an inter
partes review be issued not later than 1 year after the date on which the Director
notices the institution of a review under this chapter, except that the Director may,
for good cause shown, extend the 1-year period by not more than 6 months, and may
adjust the time periods in this paragraph in the case of joinder under section
315(c)[.]"); see also, 35 U.S.C. § 326(a)(11) (2012).
157 CONG. REC. S1376 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
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Senator Kyl went on to state:
[T]he present bill also authorizes the Director to reject any
request for ex parte reexamination or petition for post-
grant or inter partes review on the basis that the same or
substantially the same prior art or arguments previously
were presented to the Office. This will prevent parties from
mounting attacks on patents that raise issues that are
substantially the same as issues that were already before
the Office with respect to the patent. The Patent Office has
indicated that it currently is forced to accept many requests
for ex parte and inter partes reexamination that raise
challenges that are cumulative to or substantially overlap
with issues previously considered by the Office with
respect to the patent.
[.. ] The estoppels in subsection (e) will prevent inter
partes and postgrant review petitioners from seeking ex
parte reexamination of issues that were raised or could
have been raised in the interpartes or post-grant review.'
8
C. Address the concern that the USPTO was issuing "bad
pa ten ts"
For several years the press was full of stories reflecting a concern
that the USPTO issues too many bad patents:
The U.S. Patent Office, tasked with making sure patents are
only granted to genuine inventions, is failing in this essential
task. The result: a flood of bad patents on so-called
inventions that are unoriginal, vague, overbroad, and/or so
unclear that bad actors can easily use them to threaten all
kinds of innovators.1 9
Many believe the root cause of the patent system's
dysfunction is that the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office
(PTO or Agency) is issuing too many invalid patents that
unnecessarily drain consumer welfare. Concerns regarding
the Agency's over granting tendencies have recently
spurred the Supreme Court to take a renewed interest in
18 Id.
19 Patent Fail: In Defense of Innovation, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION,
(last visited Oct. 2015), https://www.eff.org/patent [http://perma.cc/WJ2Y-MPM5].
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substantive patent law and have driven Congress to enact
20the first major patent reform act in over sixty years.
A growing chorus of voices is sounding a common refrain:
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) is issuing far
too many bad patents.
21
Congress was motivated by this sentiment when it enacted the
AIA post-grant proceedings:
In addition, the bill streamlines review of patents to ensure
that the poor-quality patents can be weeded out through
administrative review rather than costly litigation.. .Indeed,
a good patent will come out of such a review strengthened
and validated.22
It will protect inventors' rights and improve transparency
and third-party participation in the patent review process.
It will strengthen patent quality and reduce costs and will
curb litigation abuses and improve certainty for investors
and innovators.
The America Invents Act will . . . improve transparency
and third party participation in the patent review process,
which will strengthen patent quality and reduce costs.
24
20 Michael D. Frakes and Melissa F. Wasserman, Does the U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office Grant Too Many Bad Patents?: Evidence from a Quasi-
Experiment, 67 STAN L. REV. 613 (2014),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2426321 [http://perma.cc/76JN-
2XXY].
21 Mark A. Lemley and Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp, 58
EMORY L. J. 181 (2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=999098
[http://perma.cc/MD3E-87SE].
2 157 Cong. Rec. 5409-10 (daily ed. Sept. 8,2011) (statement of Sen. Schumer).
23 157 CONG. REC. S5433 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
24 157 CONG. REC. S1380 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
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II. IPRS, SO FAR, HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY FAVORABLE TO
CHALLENGERS AND HAVE NOT OFFERED THE CONGRESSIONALLY-
PROMISED PROTECTION TO PATENT OWNERS
A. High petition grant rate
Fig. 1: PTAB IPR Institution Decisions, Sept. 16, 2012 -
Sept. 30, 2015. Adding institutions to joinder grants means
that 72% of petitions have resulted in an IPR.25
Filing a petition does not automatically mean that a trial will
follow, but so far, the odds are very good that the petition will be
granted on at least some of the challenged claims and on at least some
of the asserted grounds. The IPR petition grant rate started out very
high in FY2013: 82% (167/203).26 It remains high in FY2015 so far
(60%, 801/1343 not including joinder decisions; 68%, 917/1343,
25 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND
APPEAL BOARD STATISTICS (2015), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2015-09-30 20PTAB.pdf
[http://perma.cc/UAJ2-UCRP].





including joinder decisions),27 indicating that the threshold of
"reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect
to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition," is not a huge
barrier.28
B. High rate of finding claims unpatentable in instituted IPRs
Overall, across all technologies, Petitioners are obtaining a
complete "win" in 73 of the cases going through to a Final Written





*N No Instituted or Substitute Claims Survived
03 Mixed Outcome
HAll Instituted Claims Survived
Fig. 2: IPR Terminations by Case and by Claim as of July
1, 2015.30
When analyzed by claim, the results are even more positive for
petitioners because in addition to nearly 75 of the instituted claims
held unpatentable, patent owners conceded about 6 of the instituted




2 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2012).
29 Daniel F. Klodowski and David Seastrunk, Claim and Case Disposition,
http://www.aiablog.com/claim-and-case-disposition/ [http://perma.cc/N9Q8-RARZ]
(noting a "mixed" outcome means at least one instituted claim survived and at least




C3 Instituted Claims Cancelled by PTAB
13 Instituted Claims Survived
M Instituted Claims Conceded by Owner
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claims. That means about 81 of the instituted claims did not survive
an IPR. This is a very high win rate for petitioners; much higher than
ex parte reexam where the rate for certificates with all claims canceled
is 12.31 In 66 of the reexam certificates issued, at least one claim was
amended. Even assuming that half of the reexam certificates
containing amended claims may be a "win" for the third party, that is
still much lower than the IPR petitioner win rate.
Arguably, this high IPR petitioner win rate means the AIA is
achieving its objective of weeding out "bad" patents. Or perhaps this
high number in a new proceeding represents petitioners going after
"low-hanging fruit." On the other hand, this high IPR petitioner win
rate may indicate that IPRs are weeding out good patents along with
the bad.
C Challengers peaking with their feet: IPR petition filings
continue to soar
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Fig. 3: U.S. First-Instance Patent Litigation Filings. 32 5355
cases in 2014 -rep-resents a 17% decrease in the number of
district court patent infringement cases from 2013.
Meanwhile, IPR petition filings in October 2014 were more than
double that in October 2013, and then more than double again in
31 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, Ex PARTE





October 2015. In addition, the cumulative total is growing
exponentially. As of Oct. 2012, there were 41 IPR petitions filed. By
Oct. 2013, that number was 608, and by Oct. 2014 the total IPR
petitions filed were 2020. As of Sept. 30, 2015, the total number of







Oct. 2012 Oct. 2013 Oct. 2014
Fig. 4: IPR Petition Filings.34
Meanwhile, ex parte reexamination requests have plummeted.
Fig. 5: U.S. Ex Patte Reexamination Petition Filings as of
Sept. 30, 2013.35 The drop in ex parte reexamination cases from 787
in 2012 to 305 in 2013 represents a decrease of 61%.
33 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND
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The forum-shopping that is typical in district court litigation
appears to be happening with respect to IPR proceedings. Patent
challengers are attracted to the high petition grant rate and the high
claim cancellation rate and flocking to PTAB.
D. No evidence in the legislative history that AIA intended to
undermine the U.S. patent system
As is clear from the legislative history cited above, Congress did
not intend to undermine the U.S. patent system with AIA post-grant
IPRs. But the statistics above show how what a blow IPRS have been
to Patent Owners. In that dark scenario for Patent Owners, there is a
glimmer of hope: Patent Owners are having some success getting IPR
petitions denied.
E. IPR denials have been, however, for patent owners, a glimmer
of hope
Relatively speaking, patent owners have had some success at
getting IPR petitions denied. For the 72 of petitions granted/joinder,
28 have been denied.36 Institution decisions are not appealable.37
Many bases of denial are statutory, and Patent Owners can avail
themselves of those statutory provisions.38 We will now examine those
instances.
1. Petitions denied
A denied petition is a "win" for the Patent Owner. The claims of
the patent remain entirely intact and there is no appeal from that
denial. Surviving one IPR does not remove the possibility of another
challenge, either from another third party or from the same third
party based on different art, but any petition denied is still a "win" for
the Patent Owner.
There are a number of bases on which an IPR petition might be
denied. It will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case as
to which are applicable, although claim construction is an issue that
Patent Owners can expect could always be important to an institution
decision. All of these bases may be argued by the Patent Owner in
the Patent Owner's Preliminary Response ("POPR"), provided the
36 See supra Figure 1.
37 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2012); In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC, 793 F.3d
1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
38 Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,764 (Aug. 14, 2012).
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POPR does not rely on "new testimony evidence beyond that already
of record,,39 which has been interpreted to mean "'new' testimony
that was taken specifically for the purpose of the inter partes review
proceeding at issue.,40 Proposed rule changes released by the USPTO
on Aug. 20, 2015, may change this.4'
a. Failure to name real-party-in-interest as required by 35
U.S.C. § 312(a) (2)
In Zerto, Inc. v. EMC Corp., IPR2014-01329, the Patent Owner
argued in its POPR that Zerto, Inc.'s failure to identify its parent
entity, Zerto, Ltd., as a real party-in-interest was fatal to the
Petition.2 Additional discovery on the issue was granted, and both
parties submitted briefs on the real-party-in-interest issue. PTAB
decided that Zerto, Inc. should have identified Zerto, Ltd. as a real
party-in-interest as required by 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2), and denied the
petition.43  Understandably, this is a highly fact-dependent
determination.44 In this case, Zerto, Ltd. was established in Israel in
39 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(c) (2012); 37 C.F.R. § 42.207(c) (2012).
40 See Anova Food, LLC. v. Leo Sandau and William R. Kowalski, No. IPR2013-
00114, Paper 11, at 3 (P.T.A.B. June 25, 2014) ("37 C.F. R § 42.107(c) (2012) applies
only to 'new' testimony that was taken specifically for the purpose of the inter partes
review proceeding at issue, as supported by the discussion and the comments that
accompanied the rule. For example, a party submitting the prosecution history for the
challenged patent may include a copy of the declarations contained therein. The
Declaration of Milton M. Yasunaga represents new testimonial evidence as it was
created specifically for this proceeding, and authorization from the Board was not
obtained before its filing. Accordingly, it will be not be relied upon for purposes of
institution. The evidence on which it relies, however, such as Declaration of Darren
Zobrist that was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii in
Civil No. CV 11 00795 (Ex. 2009), is not 'new' testimonial evidence relied upon by the
Patent Owner to support the contentions in the preliminary response, and thus can be
appropriately submitted with the response.").
41 See Amendments to the Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial
and Appeal Board, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,720 (Aug. 20, 2015) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R.
pt. 42).
42 Zerto, Inc. v. EMC Corp., No. IPR2014-01329, Paper 12, at 1 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 3,
2014).
Zerto, Inc. v. EMC Corp., No. IPR2014-01329, Paper 33, at 2 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 3,
2015).
44 See also, Office Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,759 (Aug. 4,
2012) ("Whether a party who is not a named participant in a given proceeding
nonetheless constitutes a 'real party-in-interest' or 'privy' to that proceeding is a
highly fact-dependent question .... Such questions will be handled by the Office on a
case-by-case basis taking into consideration how courts have viewed the terms 'real
party-in-interest' and 'privy.' . . . Courts invoke the terms 'real party-in-interest' and
'privy' to describe relationships and considerations sufficient to justify applying
conventional principles of estoppel and preclusion. Accordingly, courts have avoided
rigid definitions or recitation of necessary factors.").
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2009, and in 2011, Zerto, Inc. was established in the U.S. as a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Zerto, Ltd. The boards of directors of the two
companies are the same, and the CEO of Zerto, Ltd. is the
President/CEO of Zerto, Inc.
PTAB began its analysis with the threshold issue of the statutory
requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2) that a petition "may be
considered only if- . . . the petition identifies all real parties in
interest.,45 Although generally the petitioner's identification of real
parties-in-interest in the petition is accepted, this is a "rebuttable
presumption that benefits the petitioner.''4 6 With "sufficient rebuttal
evidence that reasonably brings into question the accuracy of a
petitioner's identification of real parties-in-interest, the burden
remains with the petitioner to establish that it has complied with the
statutory requirement to identify all real parties-in-interest.,47 It is
worth noting, however, that "real-party-in-interest" is one area in
which PTAB has granted motions requesting additional discovery.48
In its POPR, Patent Owner pointed out that:
(1) Zerto, Ltd. and Zerto, Inc. hold themselves out as a
single entity;
(2) Zerto, Inc.'s failure to identify Zerto, Ltd. as a real
party-in-interest renders the Petition incomplete, and
adding Zerto, Ltd. as a real party-in-interest would require
according the Petition a new filing date, which, in turn,
would fall outside the one-year time bar set forth in 35
U.S.C. § 315(b).49
Zerto, Inc. argued that Zerto, Ltd. was not controlling or funding
this proceeding, no one from Zerto, Ltd. was acting for Zerto, Inc. in a
legal capacity, and Zerto, Inc. had not demanded that Zerto, Ltd.
indemnify Zerto, Inc. with respect to the litigation involving EMC.5°
In its Sur-Reply, Patent Owner added that Zerto, Inc. did not
45 Zerto, Inc. v. EMC Corp., No. IPR2014-01329, Paper 33, at 3 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 3,
2015).
Id. at 6-7.
47 Id. at 7.
48 See, e.g., Zerto, Inc. v. EMC Corp., No. IPR2014-01329, Paper 10 (P.T.A.B.
Nov. 25, 2014).
49 Zerto, Inc. v. EMC Corp., No. IPR2014-01329, Paper 12, at 3, 10 (P.T.A.B.
Dec. 3, 2014).
50 Zerto, Inc. v. EMC Corp., No. IPR2014-01329, Paper 33, at 9 (P.T.A.B. March
3, 2015).
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provide sufficient evidence of independence from Zerto, Ltd. or
documentation showing that Zerto Ltd. did not pay for this
proceeding.
51
PTAB concluded that Zerto, Inc. had not met its burden of
identifying all real parties-in-interest in the Petition, as required by 35
U.S.C. § 312(a)(2).52 In the totality of the circumstances, it was
"unclear whether Zerto, Ltd. and Zerto, Inc. operate as separate and
distinct entities, or effectively operate as a single entity."
53
b. Time-barred under 35 U.S.C. §315(b)
Another statutory requirement for IPR petitions is that they are
filed within one year of the filing of a district court infringement
lawsuit54 an IPR may also not be instituted if the Petitioner has filed
(at any time prior to the filing of the petition) a declaratory judgment
action of invalidity in a district court.55
St. Jude filed its petition in St. Jude Medical, Cardiology
Division, Inc. v. Volcano Corp., No. IPR2013-00258, on April 30,
2013, challenging claims in a patent also at issue between the two
parties in district court litigation in Delaware.56 St. Jude was served
with Volcano's counterclaim for infringement on September 20, 2010.
Volcano argued that St. Jude was time-barred, even though the
district court infringement allegation arose in the form of a
counterclaim.
57
PTAB agreed that St. Jude was time-barred.58 "The similarities
51 Id.
52 Id. at 14-15.
53 Id. at 14; see also Galderma S.A. & Q-MED AB v. Allergan Industries, SAS,
No. IPR2014-01417, Paper 15 (P.T.A.B. March 5, 2015).
54 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2012) ("An interpartes review may not be instituted if the
petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which
the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a
complaint alleging infringement of the patent. The time limitation set forth in the
preceding sentence shall not apply to a request for joinder under subsection (c).").
55 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1) (2012) ("An inter partes review may not be instituted if,
before the date on which the petition for such a review is filed, the petitioner or real
party in interest filed a civil action challenging the validity of a claim of the patent.");
35 U.S.C. § 325(a)(1) (2012) (noting PGRs have the same restriction, "[a] post grant
review may not be instituted under this chapter if, before the date on which the
petition for such a review is filed, the petitioner or real party in interest filed a civil
action challenging the validity of a claim of the patent.").
56 St. Jude Med., Cardiology Div., Inc. v. Volcano Corp., No. IPR2013-00258,
Paper 1 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 30, 2013).
See St. Jude Med., Cardiology Div., Inc. v. Volcano Corp., No. IPR2013-00258,
Paper 27, at 1 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 6, 2013).
58 St. Jude Med., Cardiology Div., Inc. v. Volcano Corp., No. IPR2013-00258,
Paper 29 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 16, 2013).
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between a complaint and a counterclaim underscore their equivalence
for purposes of § 315(b)."59  In addition, treating counterclaims
differently from complaints would undermine Congressional intent:
Nothing in the legislative history indicates that Congress
intended to apply the § 315(b) time limit to some, rather
than all, accused infringers. Construing "complaint" in §
315(b) restrictively, to exclude counterclaims that present
allegations of infringement, would have just that effect. It
would leave a patent open to serial attack, even after years
of patent infringement litigation, in the event that the
accused infringer is accused of infringement only via a
counterclaim. That interpretation would frustrate
Congressional intent, and would lead to unjustified
discrimination among otherwise similarly-situated accused
infringers.6 °
PTAB also noted that the fact that the parties stipulated to a
dismissal with prejudice of all claims did not matter. "Service of a
complaint alleging infringement triggers applicability of §315(b), even
if that complaint is later dismissed with prejudice."
61
Universal Remote Control, Inc. v. Universal Electronics, Inc.,
No. IPR2013-00168, provides an example of PTAB denying the
petition as time-barred because although it was filed within 12 months
of an amended complaint, it was filed outside of 12 months of the
original complaint.62 PTAB held that the statute did not imply that
"the one-year grace period applies only to the last of a chain of
multiple lawsuits or that the filing of a later lawsuit renders the service




Amneal Pharms., LLC v. Endo Pharms. Inc., No. IPR2014-00361,
presents another scenario of an amended complaint of infringement.
Endo filed the original infringement complaint on Nov. 7, 2012. Then,
64on Nov. 14, 2012, Endo added the patent at issue in the IPR petition.
59 Id. at 5.
60 Id. at 3.
61 Id. at 7; see also Macauto U.S.A. v. BOS GmbH & KG, No. IPR2012-0004,
Paper 18, at 15 (P.T.A.B. January 24, 2013) (noting that if the case is voluntarily
dismissed without prejudice, the parties are treated as if no action was ever brought).
62 See Universal Remote Control, Inc. v. Universal Elecs., Inc., No. IPR2013-
00168, Paper 9, at 3-7 (P.T.A.B. 2013).
63 Id. at 4.
64 Amneal Pharms., LLC v. Endo Pharms. Inc., No. IPR2014-00361, Paper 14, at
2-3 (P.T.A.B. July 25, 2014).
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The amended complaint was served on the petitioner on Nov. 20,
2012. On January 17, 2013, Patent Owner filed a Second Amended
Complaint. The IPR petition was filed on January 16, 2014.
PTAB held that the filing of an amended complaint does not
render "the original complaint a nullity, i.e. having no legal effect for
the purposes of § 315(b). 65 The amended complaint did not remove
the allegations of the earlier complaint. As such, the original
complaint service date of Nov. 20, 2012, applied, and Petitioner was
"'served with a complaint' alleging infringement . . . for the purposes
of § 315(b) before January 16, 2013.",66 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) barred
institution of IPR.
c. Same or substantially the same prior art/arguments under 35
U.S.C. §325(d)
Even though 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) is found in the AIA in the PGR
section, it also applies to IPRs:
(d) MULTIPLE PROCEEDINGS.- . . . In determining
whether to institute or order a proceeding under this
chapter, chapter 30 [PRIOR ART CITATIONS TO
OFFICE AND EX PARTE REEXAMINATION OF
PATENTS], or chapter 31 [INTER PARTES REVIEW],
the Director may take into account whether, and reject the
petition or request because, the same or substantially the
same prior art or arguments previously were presented to
the Office.
This provision provides PTAB with the discretion to deny a
petition if the grounds asserted have already been before the Office.
As we will see in the case examples below, "previously presented to
the Office" means either during prosecution (original, reissue, or
reexamination) or in another IPR petition.
Eighty-one IPRs where 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) was raised were
analyzed. When § 325(d) was raised based on the same art/arguments
in another IPR petition, PTAB denied the petition 61% of the time.
When § 325(d) was raised based on the same art/arguments during
prosecution (original, ex parte reexamination or reissue), PTAB
denied the petition only 17% of the time.
65 Id. at 6; see also Loral Space & Commc'ns, Inc. v. ViaSat, Inc., No. IPR2014-
00236, Paper 7, at 7 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 21, 2014).
66 Amneal Pharms., LLC v. Endo Pharms. Inc., No. IPR2014-00361, Paper 14, at
7 (P.T.A.B. July 15, 2014).
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Other IPR Petition Prosecution
Fig. 6: Comparison of success rates for grounds for denying
petition under § 325(d).67
This shows PTAB is not usually convinced to exercise its
discretion if the same art/arguments were before the Office in
prosecution, but may be more inclined to deny the petition if the same
art/arguments were raised in another IPR petition.
If the same art/arguments were raised in prosecution, PTAB
usually first notes that it is not required to reject a petition based on
those grounds, and then proceeds to find that the record before it is
not the same as that that was before the examiner:
Consistent with the statute, we have reviewed the record in
the prosecution. In summary, we are not required by
statute to reject a Petition based upon the fact that certain
arguments or art previously were considered by the Office,
and after reviewing the prosecution history, we decline to
do so in this case. See 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). The record
before us is not the same as that previously before the
Office, and we are, in any event, not persuaded by the
declarations previously submitted that apparently
influenced the outcome.
68
Even if the references are the same as those before the
67 LexMachina query, "325(d)" PTAB Institution Decisions/Decisions Denying
Institution/Decisions Granting Institution, Sept. 16, 2012 - June 10, 2015.
68 K-40 Elecs., LLC v. Escort, Inc., No. IPR2013-00203, Paper 6, at 7 (P.T.A.B.
Aug. 29. 2013).
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Examiner, the Petitioner's expert declaration alone is something new
that was not before the examiner, making the record "different."69 It
is also a fairly easy "out" for PTAB simply to note that Petitioner was
not a party to the prosecution.70 Another reason provided by PTAB
is that it disagrees with the Examiner's claim construction.71
i. "Same or substantially the same prior art or arguments"
during prosecution: a closer look at 3 cases where the petition
was denied based on same art/arguments raised during
prosecution
A. Merial Ltd. v. Virbac, No. IPR2014-01279
In Merial Ltd. v. Virbac, No. IPR2014-01279, Patent Owner filed
a Preliminary Response arguing that Ground 3 should be denied
because Petitioner relied "on the same combination of references as
used by the Examiner in a rejection, which the Examiner subsequently
withdrew, during prosecution of the application that resulted in the
'799 patent."
72
PTAB denied Merial's petition with respect to Ground 3,
agreeing that it was appropriate to exercise its discretion because the
same art/arguments were presented during prosecution.3
Merial's Petition Ground 3 was obviousness based on 4
references. During prosecution, the Examiner entered a rejection of
all claims as being unpatentable for obviousness over two of those
references. Virbac filed an amendment and relied on comparative
testing set out in the specification. The Examiner withdrew the
rejection: "[Virbac] . . has clearly shown, in a side-by-side
comparison, that instant composition A acts more quickly and
remains effective for a longer time compared to the commercial
69 See, e.g., Micron Tech., Inc. v. Univ. of Illinois, No. IPR2013-00006, Paper 15,
at 5, 7 (P.T.A.B. March 13, 2013).
70 E.g., Oracle Corp. v. Clouding IP, LLC, No. IPR2013-00100, Paper 8, at 20-21
(P.T.A.B. May 16, 2013) ("Here, unlike the case in ex parte prosecution of the
application that issued as the '891 patent, Oracle is a party to the proceeding. Oracle
presents different arguments and new supporting evidence that were not before the
examiner, shedding a different light on Aziz and Kaufman. As such, we decline to
deny this ground of unpatentability based on the combination of Aziz and Kaufman
under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d)").
71 See, e.g., Toshiba Corp. v. Intellectual Ventures, No. IPR2014-00317, Paper 11,
at 3 (P.T.A.B. June 17, 2014).
72 Merial Ltd. v. Virbac, No. IPR2014-01279, Paper 10, at 35 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 26,
2014).
73 Merial Ltd. v. Virbac, No. IPR2014-01279, Paper 13, at 10 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 22,
2015).
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",74product Frontline[®] Spot-on .... .
PTAB did not independently assess the comparative testing, and
Merial did not argue against the unexpected results in its Petition:
In submitting the Petition, Merial had an opportunity to
address the Examiner's rationale in support of allowance
of claims in the application maturing into the '799 patent.
Merial elected not to address the Examiner's allowance
rationale .... In this case, we believe it unfair to impose on
Virbac in the first instance the burden of establishing
unexpected results in a trial. Merial was aware of the
unexpected results showing which the Examiner found
persuasive in showing nonobviousness in view of
substantially the same prior art combination Merial now
relies upon. Merial should have addressed unexpected
results in the first instance .... For the reasons given, we
decline to institute an inter partes review trial on the basis
of Ground (3).75
B. Integrated Global Concepts, Inc. v. J2 Global, Inc., No.
IPR2014-01027
In Integrated Global Concepts, Inc. v. J2 Global, Inc., No.
IPR2014-01027, the Patent Owner argued in its Patent Owner
Preliminary Response that "the instant Petition merely raises
substantially the same issues, based on the same RightFAX
documents, that the Office already considered and rejected in the ex
parte reexamination of the '980 patent.,76 During the reexamination,
the Office issued a non-final Office Action rejecting claim 13 as being
obvious over the RightFAX documents.77 But then the Office
withdrew the rejection, and confirmed patentability of all claims.78
The Office "expressly stated that the RightFAX documents do not
disclose the claimed "subscriber selected" file translation
specification, and provided a detailed statement of reasons for
patentability[.]',79 Patent Owner also argued that Petitioner provided
''no new credible evidence to overturn the Office's prior
74 Id. at 25.
75 Id. at 26-28.
76 Integrated Global Concepts, Inc. v. J2 Global, Inc., No. IPR2014-01027, Paper
14, at 18 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 7, 2014).






PTAB denied institution of review of claim 13. "Petitioner's
challenge of claim 13 is based upon substantially the same prior art
and arguments that were before the Office in the ex parte
reexamination[.]y
81
PTAB concluded that Petitioner disagreed with the Examiner's
conclusion in the reexamination, but did "not present any persuasive
evidence to supplement the record that was in front of the Office
during the reexamination."82 PTAB considered Petitioner's expert's
declaration conclusory and unsupported.83
C. Prism Pharma Co., Ltd v. Choongwae Pharma Corp., No.
IPR2014-00315
In Prism Pharma Co., Ltd v. Choongwae Pharma Corp., No.
IPR2014-00315, one of the inventors of the patent was the Petitioner
(and attacked the patent during prosecution). In its POPR, Patent
Owner argued the petition should be denied under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d)
because Petitioner was raising the same § 112 arguments it did during
prosecution when it submitted unrequested Declarations by a co-
inventor attacking the claims.84 It argued separately that the petition
should be denied for inappropriately raising § 112 arguments.
85
The Examiner found the claims satisfied § 112 and were free of
the prior art. Patent Owner argued the Petitioner "should not be
granted the opportunity to revisit the same issues by way of IPR."
86
PTAB exercised its discretion and denied the petition under 35
U.S.C. § 325(d):
The same prior art (i.e., the '192 publication) and
arguments substantially the same as Petitioner's current
contention (i.e., the '192 publication is an invalidating prior
art that anticipates the challenged claims), were presented
80 Id. at 22.
81 Integrated Global Concepts, Inc. v. J2 Global, Inc., No. IPR2014-01027, Paper
16, at 2 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 22,2014).
82 Id. at 7; see also Nora Lighting, Inc. v. Juno Manufacturing, LLC, No.
IPR2015-00601, Paper 13, at 11-12 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 12, 2015) (finding that Petitioner's
prior art was substantially the same as that overcome in reexamination).
83 See Integrated Global Concepts, Inc. v. J2 Global, Inc., No. IPR2014-01027,
Paper 16, at 8 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 22, 2014).
Prism Pharma Co., Ltd v. Choongwae Pharma Corp., No. IPR2014-00315,
Paper 11, at 5 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 16, 2014).
8 Id.
86 Id. at 28.
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previously to the Office .... Aware of the '192 publication,
the Examiner, together with his supervisor, reviewed the
materials and determined that the challenged claims were
"free from prior art." . . . Based on these facts, we conclude
that the same prior art and substantially the same
arguments were presented to the Office previously. We
exercise our discretion and deny the Petition under 35
U.S.C. § 325(d).87
ii. "Same or substantially the same prior art or arguments" in
another IPR petition
When PTAB exercises its discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d)
and denies a petition, it often recites the directive of "just, speedy, and
inexpensive" proceedings.8 8
SAS Institute, Inc. v. Complementsoft, LLC, No. IPR2013-00581,
provides an example of PTAB denying a petition under § 325(d)
based on the same art/arguments already presented in another IPR
petition.
In its POPR, Patent Owner pointed out that the petition was
"duplicative of the Petitioner's request in Case IPR2013-00226 (the
'First IPR'), [ . . . ] and, on the merits, fails to make up for the
deficiencies of the First IPR.',8 9 "The remaining arguments were
already rejected by the Board, and the Petitioner does not raise any
new teachings that were not already presented in the First IPR."90
PTAB agreed, noting that an IPR was already instituted on
claims in the same patent on some of the same grounds asserted in this
petition:
SAS's petition in this case presents substantially the same
prior art and arguments previously presented in its petition
in IPR2013-00226. SAS provides no explanation as to why
the grounds of unpatentability newly offered in this
petition for claims already involved in an inter partes
review afford any benefit over those on which we have
begun proceedings. Indeed, SAS's newly asserted grounds
87 Prism Pharma Co., Ltd v. Choongwae Pharma Corp., No. IPR2014-00315,
Paper 14, at 12-13 (P.T.A.B. July 8, 2014).
See, e.g., Cont'l Auto. Sys., Inc. v. Wasica Fin. GmbH & Bluearc Fin. AG, No.
IPR2014-01454, at 4 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 13, 2015).
89 SAS Inst., Inc. v. Complementsoft, LLC, No. IPR2013-00581, Paper 14, at 3
(P.T.A.B. Oct. 25, 2013).
90 Id. at 4.
IPRs Unintended Consequences
are based on essentially the same combinations of
references .... The practice of a particular petitioner filing
serial petitions challenging claims already involved in an
instituted proceeding and asserting arguments and prior art
previously considered by the Board is contrary to the goals
set forth in our statutory mandate and implementing rules.
Under these circumstances, based on the record before us,
and exercising our discretion under 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(a),
325(d), and 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(b), we deny the petition as
to the remaining four grounds listed above because they
are based upon substantially the same prior art and
arguments as set forth in IPR2013-00226.91
d. Patent Owner's proposed claim construction supports denial
Claim construction is fundamental to most institution decisions,
and both Petitioners and Patent Owners may present proposed claim
constructions to PTAB prior to the institution decision. PTAB may
agree with Petitioner's proposed construction, Patent Owner's
proposed construction, or may independently construe the claims
according to the "broadest reasonable interpretation.
'" 92
In Lenroc Co. v. Enviro Tech. Chemical Services, Inc., No.
IPR2014-00382, PTAB agreed with the Patent Owner's proposed
claim construction. Based on that construction, the asserted prior art
did not contain a claimed limitation, and therefore, PTAB denied the
petition because Petitioner could not demonstrate a reasonable
likelihood that it would prevail.93
The term at issue was "wetcake." PTAB agreed with the Patent
Owner that the asserted prior art disclosed "formation of a dry, free-
flowing powder, not a wet solid, of monoalkali metal cyanurate ....
91 SAS Inst., Inc. v. Complementsoft, LLC, No. IPR2013-00581, Paper 15, at 22-
23 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 30, 2013); see also e.g., Intelligent Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumina
Cambridge Ltd., No. IPR2013-00324, Paper 19 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 21, 2013); Butamax
Advanced Biofuels LLC v. Gevo, Inc., No. IPR2014-00581, Paper 8 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 14,
2014); BioDelivery Scis. Int'l, Inc. v. RB Pharm. Ltd., No. IPR2014-00998, Paper 12
(P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2014).
92 37 C.F.R. § 42.100 (2014); 37 C.F.R. § 42.200 (2014); see Phigenix, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., No. IPR2014-00842, Paper 10, at 7 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 9, 2014)
(construing claims independently after noting, "[nleither party offers construction of
any claims terms"); see also AVX Corp. v. Greatbatch, Ltd., No. IPR2015-00710,
Paper 9, at 5-9 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 12, 2015) (construing independently the claim
limitation, "laminar delamination gap" and, under PTAB's construction, the asserted
prior art did not contain the claim limitation, and the petition was denied).
93 Lenroc Co. v. Enviro Tech Chem. Servs., Inc., No. IPR2014-00382, Paper 12, at
15-16 (P.T.A.B. July 24,2014).
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[a] 'wetcake,' as we interpret this claim term, does not encompass a
free-flowing powder, and does not necessarily encompass material in
the form of a hydrate.
9 4
e. Insufficient evidence resulting in denial
As discussed above, the threshold for institution is "reasonable
likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1
of the claims challenged in the petition."95 It is Petitioner's burden to
meet the threshold in the Petition.96 There are cases where PTAB
finds Petitioner fails to meet this threshold, and the petition is denied.
In Heart Failure Technologies, LLC v. Cardiokinetix, Inc., No.
IPR2013-00183, for example, PTAB concluded that one of the claim
limitations was not found in any of the asserted references and
Petitioner had not sufficiently explained, "how the teachings of the
references would be arranged or combined or why a person of
ordinary skill would have made the combination."97 PTAB will apply
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., just like the examiner and the courts
will. 98
In Biodelivery Sciences Int'l, Inc. v. Monosol Rx, LLC, No.
IPR2014-00794,99 Petitioner tried to rely on an inherency argument to
show a claimed limitation was present in the asserted reference.
Petitioner cited a supporting expert declaration. PTAB denied the
petition after holding that Petitioner had not shown that the claimed
limitation, as construed, was present in the reference.
100
Three petitions were denied in Cao Group, Inc. v. The Procter &
Gamble Co., No. IPR2014-00796, IPR2014-00797, IPR2014-00798,
because, according to PTAB, Petitioner did not show all of the claim
limitations were present in the asserted references, and the arguments
were conclusory and unsupported.'01
94 Id. at 15.
95 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2013).
96 Id.
97 Heart Failure Techs., LLC v. Cardiokinetix, Inc., No. IPR2013-00183, Paper
12, at 9 (P.T.A.B. July 31, 2013); see also, Phigenix, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. and
Immunogen, Inc., No. IPR2014-00842, Paper 10 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 9, 2014) (holding
Petitioner failed to show claimed limitation present in asserted references or that a
person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to use the recited compound
according to the claim or a reasonable expectation of success in doing so).
98 See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007).
99 Biodelivery Scis. Int'l, Inc. v. Monosol Rx, LLC, No. IPR2014-00794, Paper 7,
at 8 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 5, 2014).
100 Id. at 10-11.
101 See also denials in Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Gilead Scis., Inc., No. IPR2014-00885,
-00886, -00887, -00888 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 2014).
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f. Objective evidence of nonobviousness - a Patent Owner tool
for defeating institution
In Omron Oilfield & Marine, Inc. v. Md/Totco, A Division Of
Varco, L.P., No. IPR2013-00265, PTAB actually found Petitioner
made out a prima facie case of obviousness. But it then considered
Patent Owner's objective evidence of nonobviousness (commercial
success) presented during the reexamination. Based on the objective
evidence of nonobviousness, the petition was denied.10 2 Patent Owner
was able to rely on evidence of record in its POPR to argue against
institution.
10 3
In addition, Petitioner's anticipation grounds were denied for
failure to show a claimed limitation was present in the reference.10 4
g. Patent Owner shows that the reference is not prior art
In the POPR, the Patent Owner can challenge the asserted
references characterized by Petitioner as prior art. For example, the
Patent Owner may argue that the reference does not antedate the
challenged patent claims and is not prior art. This is what the Patent
Owner did in Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Millenium Biologix, LLC,
No. IPR2013-00583. Patent Owner argued that the asserted reference,
"Bigi 1997 was published after the priority date of the claims at
issue."
105
Petitioner argued that the claims were not entitled to date
benefit of the priority application, and the reference was prior art.0 6
PTAB denied the petition; it rejected Petitioner's argument
asserting that the challenged claims were not entitled to priority date
benefit. Because the claims were entitled to date benefit, the
reference could not be prior art under §102 or §103.1°7 In addition,
PTAB noted that Petitioner's arguments were inconsistent with those
it raised in another IPR petition, IPR2013-00582.108
102 Omron Oilfield & Marine, Inc. v. Md/Totco, A Division of Varco, L.P., No.
IPR2013-00265, Paper 11 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 31, 2013).
103 Omron Oilfield & Marine, Inc. v. Md/Totco, A Division Of Varco, L.P., No.
IPR2013-00265, Paper 10 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 6, 2013).
104 Omron Oilfield & Marine, Inc. v. Md/Totco, A Division Of Varco, L.P., No.
IPR2013-00265, Paper 11, at 10 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 31, 2013).
105 Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Millenium Biologix, LLC, No. IPR2013-00583,
Paper 8, at 1 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 26, 2013).
Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Millenium Biologix, LLC, No. IPR2013-00583,
Paper 1, at 8-9 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 16, 2013).
Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Millenium Biologix, LLC, No. IPR2013-00583,
Paper 9, at 7-8 (P.T.A.B. March 21, 2014).
08 Id. at 7.
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In Actavis, Inc. v. Research Corporation Technologies, Inc., No.
IPR2014-01126, Patent Owner challenged the status of a reference as
35 U.S.C. §102(b) prior art.'t 9 The asserted reference was a university
thesis. Patent Owner argued that Petitioner had not shown that the
thesis was sufficiently publicly accessible to qualify as prior art.
110
PTAB agreed.11' PTAB cited CCPA cases holding that "a thesis,
merely deposited in a university library where it remained
'uncatalogued and unshelved' before the critical date, is not
sufficiently accessible to qualify as a printed publication."
'"12
According to PTAB, Petitioner did not "argue or present
competent evidence to show that the LeGall thesis was indexed,
cataloged, shelved, or even deposited in the University of Houston
library, at any date. Instead, Petitioner asserts that the title of the
LeGall thesis would have alerted a reasonably diligent skilled artisan
of its subject matter and 'to locate the thesis at the University of
Houston's library."'13 This overlooks the first step, which is how a
POSITA would "become aware of the title of the LeGall thesis, or
how knowing the generic structure of the compounds studied would
lead to locating the thesis, assuming it was deposited."11 4 There was
also no evidence that the "university library allowed public access to
the thesis or that the thesis was accessed by the public prior to the
critical date."" 5 PTAB concluded that there was insufficient evidence
that the thesis was a "printed publication" under § 102(b), and
therefore institution was denied on that ground."
16
109 Actavis, Inc. v. Research Corporation Technologies, Inc., No. IPR2014-01126,
Paper 19 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 23, 2014).
Id. at 27-30.
il Actavis, Inc. v. Research Corporation Technologies, Inc., No. IPR2014-01126,
Paper 22, at 9 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 9, 2015).
12 Id. at 10.
113 Id. at 11.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 12.
116 Id. at 13; see also Apple v Document Security Sys., No. IPR2015-00369, Paper
9, at 12 (P.T.A.B. June 25, 2015) (instituted on other grounds); Apple v DSS Tech.
Mgmt., Inc., No. IPR2015-00369, Paper 14, at 12-13 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 12, 2015) (denying
rehearing on status of thesis as prior art); Coalition For Affordable Drugs LLC v.
Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., No. IPR2015-00720, Paper 15, at 5 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 24,
2015); Coalition For Affordable Drugs LLC v. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., No.
IPR2015-00817, Paper 12, at 5 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 24, 2015) (rejecting a poser as prior
art). Compare Taiwan Semiconductor v. Zond LLC, No. IPR2014-00781, Paper 53, at
43 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 14, 2015) (4-1 decision) (finding a thesis was found to be a printed
publication) (Stephens, J. dissenting).
2PRs Unintended Consequences
2. Petitions granted but number of claims to trial reduced and/or
grounds narrowed
When PTAB makes an institution decision, it does not have to
accept or reject the entire petition.117 It can, and often does, either
grant the petition as to less than all the challenged claims and/or grant
the petition on fewer than all asserted grounds. The trial then
proceeds as decided. From the Patent Owner's perspective, while
complete denial is the best outcome, either of these two situations is
still preferred over institution of all challenged claims on all asserted
grounds. If the IPR is instituted on fewer than all challenged claims,
the ones excluded have "survived." If the IPR is instituted on less
than all asserted grounds, Patent Owner's arguments can be more
narrowly focused.
For example, in Complete Nutrition Holdings, Inc. v. Vireo
Systems, Inc., No. IPR2014-00451, Petitioner challenged all claims in
the patent (20) on 14 grounds.'1 PTAB instituted trial on one claim
on one ground.119 Similarly, in Clio USA, Inc. v. The Procter &
Gamble Company, No. IPR2013-00438, Petitioner challenged 11
claims on 6 grounds.1 20 PTAB instituted trial on one claim on one
ground.121 With respect to the other grounds, PTAB found that the
Petitioner did not meet the threshold for institution.
This shows that the institution decision is a substantive one and is
consistent with Congress' intention that the post-grant proceedings be
"front-loaded."1 22 Parties are ill-advised to wait with their arguments
until after institution. As PTAB stated in Actavis, Inc. v. Research
Corporation Technologies, Inc., No. IPR2014-01126:
Therefore, based on the record before us, we determine
117 In re Schott Gemtron Corp., -F.3d (Fed. Cir. Aug. 11, 2015), aff'd sub nom.
Schott Gemtron Corp. v. SSW Holding Comp., Inc. (August 11, 2015),
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/15-
1073.Rule 36 Judgment.8-10-2015.1.PDF [http://perma.ccV3SW-BWGV] (Federal
Circuit decided that it was acceptable for PTAB to institute on fewer than all
challenged claims and/or fewer than all asserted grounds).
118 Complete Nutrition Holdings, Inc. v. Vireo Systems, Inc., No. IPR2014-00451,
Paper 2 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 20,2014).
Complete Nutrition Holdings, Inc. v. Vireo Systems, Inc., No. IPR2014-00451,
Paper 10 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 2, 2014).
Clio USA, Inc. v. The Procter & Gamble Company, No. IPR2013-00438, Paper
1 (P.T.A.B. July 12, 2013).
121 Clio USA, Inc. v. The Procter & Gamble Company, No. IPR2013-00438, Paper
9 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 9, 2014).
122 154 CONG. REC. S9987 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 2008); 157 CONG. REC. S1376 (daily
ed. Mar. 8, 2011).
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that Petitioner has not provided competent evidence to
qualify the LeGall thesis as a "printed publication" under §
102(b). Petitioner may have recognized this deficiency.
Indeed, in a footnote, Petitioner states that it "reserves the
right to supplement his Petition with additional evidence
that the LeGall thesis was accessible to a POSA well
before" the critical date. Pet. 36 n. 3. But a party may only
submit supplemental information after a trial has been
instituted (37 C.ER. § 42.123) while we must decide
whether to institute a trial based on "the information
presented in the petition" (35 U.S.C. § 314(a)). Because
the Petition and the accompanying evidence are
insufficient to qualify the LeGall thesis as a § 102(b) prior
art, we deny the Petition regarding this ground.23
(emphasis added)
III. TAKING OUT THE GOOD PATENTS WITH THE BAD
I
A. Proceedings favor Petitioners
But for the glimmer of hope for Patent Owners described above
of at least a chance of having the petition denied,24 IPR proceedings
have several features that decidedly favor Petitioners. These features
all contribute to the perhaps unanticipated negative impact IPRs have
had on Patent Owners, as seen in the high petition grant rate125 and
the high rate of patent claims being held unpatentable.26 With such
high petition grant rates and high rates of canceling claims, it raises
the question whether AIA IPRs are taking out good patents with the
bad. Let us now look at some factors at play.
1. Petitioner has more time to prepare petition/Patent Owner
has limited time to prepare preliminary response
IPRs can generally be filed anytime up until a patent expires.
127
If a patent is not in litigation, the Petitioner has nearly unlimited time
123 Actavis, Inc. v. Research Corporation Technologies, Inc., No. IPR2014-01126,
Paper 21, at 13 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 9, 2015).
See supra note 22 (noting Fig. 1, as of July 31, 2015, nearly 27% of institution
decisions have resulted in denials).
125 See supra note 25 (noting Fig. 1, as of July 31, 2015, nearly 67% of petitions
have been granted).
126 See supra note 30 (noting Fig. 2, as of July 1, 2015, nearly 75% of instituted
claims held unpatentable).
127 35 U.S.C. § 311(c) (2013).
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to prepare a petition, including finding an expert and preparing an
expert declaration to support the petition. If a patent is in litigation,
the Petitioner has up to twelve months from service of the
infringement complaint in which to file a petition.128 Compare this to
the three months a Patent Owner has to prepare a Patent Owner
Preliminary Response in an effort to have the IPR petition denied.
129
2. Petitioner allowed to submit declaration evidence in
petition/Patent Owner not allowed to submit new declaration in
preliminary response or submit an amendment
By statute, a Petitioner is allowed to submit supporting
declaration evidence with the petition.130  According to the current
USPTO rules, a Patent Owner is not allowed to "present new
testimony evidence beyond that already of record, except as
authorized by the Board.' 3' One PTAB decision articulated this
prohibition as applying to "'new' testimony that was taken specifically
for the purpose of the inter partes review proceeding at issue.1 32 The
statute simply gives Patent Owners the right to file a preliminary
response prior to the institution decision providing reasons why the
petition should be denied.133  Moreover, again by rule, the Patent
128 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2011).
129 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(b) (2014) ("The preliminary response must be filed no later
than three months after the date of a notice indicating that the request to institute an
inter partes review has been granted a filing date.").
130 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)(B) (2012).
131 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(c) (2014). But see Patent and Trademark Office, 77 Fed.
Reg. 48,764 (Aug. 14, 2012) ("New testimonial evidence may be permitted where a
party demonstrates that such evidence is in the interests of justice. For example, the
Board may permit new testimonial evidence where it addresses issues relating to the
petitioner's standing, or where the Board determines that consideration of the
identified evidence is necessary in the interests of justice as the evidence
demonstrates that the trial may not be instituted.").
132 Anova Food, LLC. v. Sandau, No. IPR2013-00114, Paper 11, at 3 (P.T.A.B.
June 25, 2014) ("37 C.F. R § 42.107(c) applies only to 'new' testimony that was taken
specifically for the purpose of the inter partes review proceeding at issue, as
supported by the discussion and the comments that accompanied the rule. For
example, a party submitting the prosecution history for the challenged patent may
include a copy of the declarations contained therein. The Declaration of Milton M.
Yasunaga represents new testimonial evidence as it was created specifically for this
proceeding, and authorization from the Board was not obtained before its filing.
Accordingly, it will be not be relied upon for purposes of institution. The evidence on
which it relies, however, such as Declaration of Darren Zobrist that was filed in the
United States District Court for the District of Hawaii in Civil No. CV 11 00795 (Ex.
2009), is not 'new' testimonial evidence relied upon by the Patent Owner to support
the contentions in the preliminary response, and thus can be appropriately submitted
with the response.").
133 35 U.S.C. § 313 (2014) ("If an inter partes review petition is filed under section
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Owner is not allowed to amend claims in the preliminary response.
34
On August 20, 2015, the USPTO released proposed
Amendments to the Rules of Practice for Trials before PTAB, 80 Fed.
Reg. 50,720 (Aug. 20, 2015), that would allow Patent Owners to
include expert declarations and other testimonial evidence generated
for the IPR with their POPR.35
3. The Big 3: "Broadest reasonable interpretation" claim
construction; no presumption of validity; standard of proof to
show unpatentability is preponderance of the evidence
The "Big 3" really show the fundamental differences between
AIA IPRs and district court litigation. PTAB applies a "broadest
reasonable interpretation" claim construction,136 while district courts
311, the patent owner shall have the right to file a preliminary response to the
petition, within a time period set by the Director, that sets forth reasons why no inter
partes review should be instituted based upon the failure of the petition to meet any
requirement of this chapter.").
4 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(d) (2012) (nothing the preliminary response shall not
include any amendment).
135 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(a) (2012) (noting proposed rule changes in italics, "patent
owner may file a preliminary response to the petition. The response may set forth the
reasons why no inter partes review should be instituted under 35 U.S.C. 314 and can
include supporting evidence. The preliminary response is subject to the word count
under §42.24."); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c) (2012) (noting proposed rule changes in italics,
"[s]ufficient grounds. Inter partes review shall not be instituted for a ground of
unpatentability unless the Board decides that the petition supporting the ground
would demonstrate that there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one of the claims
challenged in the petition is unpatentable. The Board's decision will take into account
a patent owner preliminary response where such a response is filed, but supporting
evidence concerning disputed material facts will be viewed in the light most favorable
to the petitioner for purposes of deciding whether to institute an inter partes review.
If the patent owner submits supporting evidence with its preliminary response, the
petitioner may seek leave to file a reply to the preliminary response in accordance
with § 42.24(c).") (emphasis added).
136 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2014); Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg.
48,756, 48,764 (Aug. 14, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42); ("The Office has for
decades employed the broadest reasonable interpretation standard to construe claims
before the Office, and it will continue to do so in IPR, PGR, and CBM proceedings
for construing challenged claims as well as any amended or new claims."); Office
Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,764 (Aug. 14, 2012) (to be
codified at 37 C.R.R. pt. 42) ("An essential purpose of the broadest reasonable claim
interpretation standard in the amendment process is to encourage a patent owner to
fashion clear, unambiguous claims. Only through the use of the broadest reasonable
claim interpretation standard can the Office ensure that uncertainties of claim scope
are removed or clarified. Since patent owners have the opportunity to amend their
claims during IPR, PGR, and CBM trials, unlike in district court proceedings, they are
able to resolve ambiguities and overbreadth through this interpretive approach,
producing clear and defensible patents at the lowest cost point in the system. Patent
owners in IPR, PGR, and CBM proceedings will be permitted to file a first motion to
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follow the Phillips framework.137  While the "broadest reasonable
interpretation" standard is consistent with the claims being in the
USPTO, IPRs are in fact quite different than prosecution because the
ability to amend claims in IPRs so far has been virtually
nonexistent.138 Of 450 substitute claims considered as of Oct. 1, 2015,
only 26 were granted (6 ).139
Before PTAB, there is no presumption of validity accorded
issued claims; in district court litigation there is.
140
By statute, Petitioner only has to show unpatentability to a
preponderance of the evidence.141 This is a lower standard than the
"clear and convincing evidence" required in district court litigation to
invalidate a patent. And this is once the IPR is instituted. To get an
IPR trial instituted, the threshold a Petitioner must meet is arguably
even lower: "[A] reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would
prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the
petition."
' 142
4. No deference to judicial decisions; the only time there is
certainty is when claims are finally held unpatentable or invalid,
there is no "certainty equivalent" on the positive side, e.g., a
amend the patent, after conferring with the Board. §§ 42.121(a) and 42.221(a).
Moreover, although there is no need to permit multiple opportunities to amend to
justify the application of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard in an Office
proceeding, patent owners in IPR, PGR, and CBM proceedings may file an additional
motion to amend when there is a good cause showing, or a joint request of the
petitioner and the patent owner to materially advance a settlement. §§ 42.121(c) and
42.221(c)."); see also infra Article 6, Stacy Lewis and Tom Irving, Amending Rather
Than Cancelling Claims in Inter Partes Reviews (noting that although the application
of BRI is usually justified because of Patent Owner's ability to amend the claims, in
IPRs so far, this ability has been largely unavailable.).
137 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)
("ordinary and customary meaning as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in
the art in the context of the entire patent disclosure."); In re Cuozzo Speed
Technologies, LLC, 793 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Federal Circuit held there was no
error in PTAB's application of the BRI claim construction standard).
138 See infra Article 6, Stacy Lewis and Tom Irving, Amending Rather Than
Cancelling Claims in Inter Partes Reviews.
139 Daniel F. Klodowski and David Seastrunk, Claim and Case Disposition,
http://www.aiablog.com/claim-and-case-disposition/ [http://perma.cc/N9Q8-RARZ].
140 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012); Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review
Proceedings, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,680, 48,697 (Aug. 14, 2012) (to be codified 37 C.F.R. pt.
42) ("district courts must use the clear and convincing standard, and the patent claims
are presumed to be valid in infringement litigation. [ . . . ] Furthermore, courts
construe patent claims, if possible, to avoid invalidity.").
141 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (2012) ("In an inter partes review instituted under this
chapter, the petitioner shall have the burden of proving a proposition of
unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence.").
42 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2012).
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patent held valid and enforceable in district court litigation can
still be challenged in the USPTO
Beyond the estoppel provision of 35 U.S.C. § 315(e), PTAB does
not have to defer to other administrative proceeding decisions or
judicial decisions, whether interim (e.g. claim construction143) or
final.1' Patent Owners face a reality in which a patent could be held
valid, infringed, and enforceable in litigation, and still be challenged
later in an IPR.45 By statute, PTAB can institute an IPR even if the
same prior art/arguments were raised and decided in a previous
USPTO proceeding.146 As noted by PTAB in Nexans, Inc. v. Belden
Technologies Inc., No. IPR2013-00057, "[t]he statutory provision does
not require the Director, in deciding whether to institute inter partes
review, to defer to a prior determination in the Patent and Trademark
Office, even one which considered the same prior art and
arguments."147
Additionally, PTAB is not bound by judicial decisions:
[T]he jury's finding that Petitioner had not proved invalid
any claim of the '201 Patent under the clear and convincing
evidence standard, is not binding on the Board, which
143 Google, Inc. v. Whitserve LLC, No. IPR2013-00249, Paper 32, at 19-21
(P.T.A.B. Sept. 9, 2014) ("Whitserve argues that this statement by the Federal Circuit
controls our construction of claims 3, 6, and 9, and requires us to adopt Whitserve's
proffered construction instead of the broadest reasonable interpretation discussed
above. We disagree . . . even if the Federal Circuit had set forth a construction of
claims 3, 6, and 9 that differs from ours, we note that the Computer Packages appeal
was from a district court infringement suit, and therefore applied the claim
construction standard articulated in Phillips v. A WH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir.
2005). By contrast, in inter partes review proceedings the Board applies the broadest
reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b);...
The Federal Circuit has affirmed prior Board decisions adopting claim constructions
that differ from those reached under the standard discussed in Phillips. See In re
Trans Texas Holdings Corp., 498 F.3d 1290, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2007); In re Translogic
Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d at 1257. Furthermore, the Court has recognized that 'different
results' in the outcome of validity challenges 'in the two forums may be entirely
reasonable.' Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1988)"); see also
Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,766 (Aug. 14, 2012) (to be
codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42); 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2012); Changes to Implement
Inter Partes Review Proceedings, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,680, 48,697 (Aug. 14, 2012).
144 See 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) (2012); In re Baxter Int'l, 678 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012);
Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int'l., Inc., (Fresenius II), 721 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir.
2013), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 2295 (U.S. 2014).
145 See, e.g., Ferrum Ferro Capital, LLC v. Allergan Sales, LLC, No. IPR2015-
00858, Paper 10 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 21, 2015).
146 See 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) (2012).
147 Nexans, Inc. v. Belden Technologies Inc., No. IPR2013-00057, Paper 11, at 8
(P.T.A.B. Apr. 16, 2013).
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evaluates claim patentability and applies a preponderance
of the evidence standard.
148
Without deference to judicial decisions, the only time there is
certainty for a Patent Owner is when claims are finally held invalid by
a court or unpatentable by PTAB. There is no "certainty equivalent"
on the positive side, e.g., a patent held valid and enforceable prevents
any future challenges, whether in court or in the USPTO.
5. Patent Owner Preliminary Response (POPR) supposed to be
optional and supposedly no prejudice if don't file, but denial rate
higher when the Patent Owner files a POPR
35 U.S.C. § 313 provides that Patent Owners "shall have the right
to file" a preliminary response to the petition prior to PTAB's
institution decision. The language in the rules says a Patent Owner
"may file" a preliminary response, or may "expedite the proceeding
by filing an election to waive the patent owner preliminary
response."'149 The rules also indicate that PTAB's institution decision
"will take into account a patent owner preliminary response where
such a response is filed[,]" 15 and "[n]o adverse inferences will be
drawn where a patent owner elects not to file a response or elects to
waive the response.""15 In the PTAB final rules the USPTO predicted
that "90% of patent owners will file a preliminary response."'
52
According to the USPTO statistics, it appears to be approaching that:
79 in FY2013 (237 filed, 63 waived); 80 in FY2014 (829 filed, 202
waived); 86 FY2015 to date (1326 filed, 223 waived).53
Although the POPR is supposed to be optional, Patent Owner's
chances of having an IPR petition denied increase when an effective
POPR is filed. Looking at a sample of 234 bio/pharma/chemical IPR
institution decisions, in 65 of the 222, the petition was denied, and in
61of those 65 a POPR was filed (94%).154 In 169 cases, trial was
148 Interthinx, Inc. v. CoreLogic Solutions, LLC, No. CBM2012-00007, Paper 58,
at 7 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 30, 2014); see also ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 789 F.3d
1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
149 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(a) (2012).
150 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c) (2012).
151 Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,680,
48,689 and 48,692 (Aug. 14, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42).
152 Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 77 Fed.
Req. 48,612, 48,655 (Aug. 14, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1, 42, and 9).
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, AIA PROGRESS (2015),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2015-09-
30 20PTAB.pdf [http://perma.cc/UAJ2-UCRP].
154 Source: Finnegan research; 234 institution decisions as of Sept. 30, 2015.
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instituted on at least one challenged claim and at least one asserted
ground, and in 127 of those, a POPR was filed (75%).155
The nearly 20 difference in positive outcome for the Patent
Owner may be due to the Patent Owner filing a POPR. The POPR
provides the Patent Owner with the opportunity to attack Petitioner's
standing, attack the status of references as prior art, propose claim
constructions, attack unpatentability arguments, and tell PTAB why
the petition should be denied before a decision on institution. It also
provides the Patent Owner with the opportunity to propose a desired
claim construction, which, if adopted by PTAB, may lead to a denied
petition, narrowed claims and/or grounds, or, at least, a trial instituted
using the Patent Owner's desired claim construction rather than the
Petitioner's.
When IPR proceedings were first introduced, there was some
concern that filing a POPR was too much "showing your hand" to the
Petitioner. This concern loses its persuasiveness in the reality faced
by Patent Owners of the Petitioner-favorable high IPR petition grant
rate and the high claim cancellation rate.
6. Estoppel provisions so far have not been much of a hindrance
to Petitioners but hurt Patent Owners
a. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e): Petitioner estopped from raising "any
ground that the petitioner aised or reasonably could have
raised" in proceeding before USPTO, district court or ITC
Looking at the legislative history, Congress seems to have
expected the Petitioner estoppel provisions, particularly the addition
of "or reasonably could have raised" to be a deterrent to filing IPR
petitions:
Patent protection will be stronger with the inclusion of
"could have raised" estoppel, strong administrative
estoppel, and explicit statutory authority for the Patent and
Trademark Office, PTO, to reject petitions by third parties
and order joinder of related parties.
56
Earlier, however, Senator Kyl seemed to recognize that the
Petitioner estoppel would not be a very Patent Owner-friendly
provision:
155 Id.
156 157 CONG. REC. S1367 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kohl).
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Second, a number of parties have expressed concern to me
about the current could-have-raised estoppel standard,
which I have carried over to second-period proceedings in
section 322(d)(2). It is arguable that applying could-have-
raised estoppel to the second window does not actually
protect the interests that it is designed to vindicate. This
estoppel standard's main purpose appears to be to force a
party to bring all of his claims in one forum-everything
that he "could have raised"-and therefore to eliminate
the need to press any claims in other fora. In this bill,
however, the issues that can be raised in the second
window are so sharply limited that the goal of flushing out
all claims is unattainable. Only 102 and 103 arguments
based on patents and printed publications can be raised in
the second window. Accused infringers inevitably will have
other challenges and defenses that they will want to bring,
and those arguments can only be raised in district court.
Regardless of the estoppel standard that is applied, the
patent owner will almost always be forced to fight in two
fora, and the intended goal of could-have-raised estoppel
will remain beyond reach (emphasis added).157
The Petitioner estoppel provision does not seem to have
dissuaded IPR petition filings, which continue to rise, and now
number over 3500.158 The high petition grant rate and high patent
cancellation rate so far indicate that Petitioners are not avoiding IPR
proceedings for fear of estoppel.
b. 37 C.F.R. § 42. 73(d)(3) "A patent applicant or owner is
precluded from taking action inconsistent with the adverse
judgment, including obtaining in any patent"
The Patent Owner estoppel provisions are very Patent Owner-
unfriendly and have a real negative impact on Patent Owners. Note
that Patent Owner estoppel is only found in the rules, not the statute.
The full rule reads:
157 154 CONG. REC. S9989 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
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(3) Patent applicant or owner. A patent applicant or owner
is precluded from taking action inconsistent with the
adverse judgment, including obtaining in any patent:
(i) A claim that is not patentably distinct from a
finally refused or canceled claim; or
(ii) An amendment of a specification or of a drawing
that was denied during the trial proceeding, but this
provision does not apply to an application or patent
that has a different written description.159
The only good news is that the final rule did not include the
original proposed estoppel provision against obtaining "[a] claim that
could have been filed in response to any properly raised ground of
unpatentability for a finally refused or cancelled claim"!
160
There was some concern expressed to the USPTO before the
rules were made final about the Patent Owner estoppel provisions. In
particular, the concern was expressed about whether that provision
had a statutory basis.161 According to the USPTO, the statutory
directive in 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(4) to make regulations for the relation
between IPRs and other USPTO proceedings provides sufficient
basis.'62 Further:
Section 42.73(d)(3)(i), as adopted in this final rule, merely
provides estoppel against claims that are patentably
indistinct from those claims that were lost, and claim
amendments that were presented and denied, during a
trial. In other words, the patent owner may subsequently
present in a continuing or reissue application claims that
are patentably distinct from such claims. As such,
§42.73(d)(3) set forth in this final rule is consistent with the
AIA, other statutory provisions, the common law related
to estoppel, and the common law related to the recapture
rule.
163
159 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(d)(3) (2012).
160 Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,612, 48,649
(proposed Aug. 14, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 90).
161 See id.
162 See id.
163 Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,649
(citing In re Deckler, 977 F.2d 1449, 1452 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Clement, 131 F.3d
1464, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
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B. PTAB treats patent as if it is back in prosecution, but at the
same time has been very reluctant to grant motions to amend
claims
PTAB's application of a "broadest reasonable interpretation"
claim construction standard, no presumption of validity accorded
issued claims, and a preponderance of the evidence, are all consistent
with conventional USPTO practice. These "Big 3" standards have
been justified by the principle that when the claims are before the
USPTO, they are not final, but rather could possibly be amended in
the "give and take" of patent prosecution.64 The virtual nonexistence
of the ability to amend claims in IPR, however, presents a far different
situation than the "give and take" of prosecution.165 The reality for
Patent Owners is that their opponents get the benefit of significantly
lower standards than in district court litigation, but Patent Owners do
not get the corresponding benefit of an ability to amend their claims
in response to the unpatentability assertions. It's the worst of both
worlds for the Patent Owners.
C. AIA drafters went too far in attempting to address "bad"
patents?
1. Proceedings too heavily tilted in favor of Petitioners
No presumption of validity, broadest reasonable interpretation
(including no principle of construing a claim to preserve validity 66),
and a preponderance of the evidence standard, in addition to the
features discussed above, significantly weigh the proceedings in favor
of Petitioners. In their effort to address "bad" patents, did the AIA
164 See also Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,766 (Aug.
14, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42); 37 C.F.R. § 100(b) (2012); Changes to
Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,680, 48,697 (Aug. 14,
2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42).
165 See infra Article 6, Stacy Lewis and Tom Irving, Amending Rather Than
Cancelling Claims in Inter Partes Reviews.
166 Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, 77 Fed. Reg. at
48,697 ("The provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act indicate that the
typical standard applicable to USPTO proceedings should apply as well to these trial
proceedings. The typical justifications for using the "broadest reasonable
interpretation standard"- particularly the ability to amend claims, application of the
lower "preponderance of the evidence standard" for determining patentability (35
U.S.C. 316(e), as amended, and 35 U.S.C. 326(e), and the absence of a presumption of
validity)-are explicitly provided for by the Act, or consistent with it. In contrast,
district courts must use the clear and convincing standard, and the patent claims are
presumed to be valid in infringement litigation. [... ] Furthermore, courts construe
patent claims, if possible, to avoid invalidity.").
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drafters intend to punish Patent Owners? Probably not. But it does
seem that the AIA post-grant proceedings have brought surprises,
including the huge uptake in filing petitions and the overwhelmingly
"anti-patent" results so far.
2. Not enough Patent Owner-friendly provisions
Even the few provisions that possibly were intended to support
Patent Owners, such as the petitioner estoppel provisions, limited
discovery, and a statutory right to one motion to amend, (35 U.S.C.
§316(d)/§326(d)) (and possibly even additional motions to amend),
have not had a positive impact for Patent Owners in AIA post-grant
proceedings to date.
3. Losing "good"patents with the "bad"
So the question is, are we losing "good" patents with the "bad"?
Recent patent law reform bills may indicate that at least some people
think the answer is "yes."
The proposed Innovation Act (H.R. 9), STRONG Patents Act of
2015 (S. 632), and PATENT ACT (S. 1137), each include provisions
requiring use of a district court claim construction standard and, if
there is one, consideration of a district court's claim construction. The
STRONG Act goes farthest, also providing for automatic entry of
proposed substitute claims if the number of proposed substitute claims
is reasonable, presumption of validity for issued claims, a clear and
convincing evidence standard for issued claims, and no institution
permitted if there is a pending reexamination or reissue proceeding.
None of the proposed bills passed as of Nov. 1, 2015.
VII. POSSIBLE FUTURE SCENARIOS
A. No change
The America Invents Act was the fourth attempt in several years
at patent law reform. Change does not come quickly or easily. There
is a reasonable likelihood that there will not be any change in the IPR
statutory framework in the foreseeable future.
B. With benefit of 3 years of experience with IPRs, statutory
provisions and rules are changed, maybe slightly, maybe
significantly
Then again, intellectual property is a hot topic, and patent law
reform is more in the front of lawmakers' minds than arguably ever
IPRs Unintended Consequences
before. Patent law reform efforts continue in Congress, as noted
above.
The USPTO introduced aproposed rule package in August
2015,167 on the heels of a "quick fix" package announced in the spring
of 2015.168 More PTAB case law is building up too, with "informative"
and "representative" decisions designated to help practitioners.1
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C PTAB effectively slows the slaughter by denying more
petitions (possibly because of internal workload pressure)
Filing a petition does not automatically mean that a trial will
follow, but so far, the odds are very good that the petition will be
granted on at least some of the challenged claims and on at least some
of the asserted grounds. The IPR petition grant rate started out very
high in FY2013: 82% (167/203).70 It remains high in FY2015 so far
(60%, 801/1343 not including joinder decisions; 68%, 917/1343,
However, the rate of petition denials has risen from the first year.
167 See Amendments to the Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial and
Arseal Board, 80 Fed. Reg. 28,561 (May 19, 2015) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. 42).
8 Michelle K. Lee, PTAB'S Quick-Fixes for AIA Rules Are to Be Implemented
Immediately Director's Forum: A Blog from USPTO's Leadership, USPTO. (Mar. 27,
2015), http://www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/ptab_s_quickfixes-for
[http://perma.cc/H7LM-TNCL].
169 See Decisions, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-
process/patent-trial-and-appeal-board/decisions [http://perma.cc/WG23-MF8F].
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Fig. 7: Percentage of petitions denied as of Sept. 30, 2015,
excluding joindeTs (petitions denied/petitions denied +
petitions granted).7
Meanwhile petition filings continue to rise.
Number of AJAPetitionsFiled by Fiscal Year by Type
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Fig. 8: Petition filings as of Sept. 30, 2015.172
PTAB judges face a growing workload of
continuing to address its other tasks such as ex
prosecution appeals). The non-appealability









decision173 means the institution decision is an important tool at
PTAB's disposal for controlling work flow. There is also pressure
from the statutory timeline for institution decisions set forth in the
AIA (3 months from filing of POPR or last date a POPR could have
been filed). 174  Another tool for putting off the starting of the
statutory clock at PTAB's disposal is to delay according the petition a
filing date.
It is interesting to note that in the legislative history, Senator Kyl
speculated that the threshold for IPRs would be higher than that of ex
parte reexamination, and that this would help control its workload:
This threshold is designed, among other things, to force a
petitioner to present all of his best evidence against a
patent up front. His petition itself must present a full
affirmative case. It thus reinforces the frontloaded nature
of an oppositional system, which is critical to the efficient
resolution of proceedings by PTO. This threshold is
considerably higher than "significant new question of
patentability," and thus, particularly in combination with
the mandates of section 329(c), should provide the PTO
with sufficient discretion to protect itself against being
overwhelmed by a deluge of petitions.75
See also:
Among the most important protections for patent owners
added by the present bill are its elevated thresholds for
instituting inter partes and postgrant reviews. The present
bill dispenses with the test of "substantial new question of
patentability," a standard that currently allows 95% of all
requests to be granted. It instead imposes thresholds that
require petitioners to present information that creates
serious doubts about the patent's validity . . . . The
"reasonable likelihood" test is currently used in evaluating
173 See generally 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 324(e) (2006); 37 C.F.R. §
42.71(c) (2012); In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC, 793 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir.
2015).
174 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2011); 35 U.S.C. § 324(C) (2011); 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(b)
(2012); 37 C.F.R. 42.207(b) (2012) ("(b) Due date.- The preliminary response must
be filed no later than three months after the date of a notice indicating that the
request to institute a post-grant review has been granted a filing date. A patent owner
may expedite the proceeding by filing an election to waive the patent owner
preliminary response.").
175 154 CONG. REC. S9987 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
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whether a party is entitled to a preliminary injunction, and
effectively requires the petitioner to present a prima facie
case justifying a rejection of the claims in the patent. Post-
grant review uses the "more likely than not invalid" test.
This slightly higher threshold is used because some of the
issues that can be raised in post-grant review, such as
enablement and section 101 invention issues, may require
development through discovery. The Office wants to ensure
that petitioners raising such issues present a complete case
at the outset, and are not relying on obtaining information
in discovery in the post-grant review in order to satisfy their
ultimate burden of showing invalidity by a preponderance
of the evidence.'
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However, as noted above, a deluge of IPR petitions has in fact
been filed and a majority of those have been granted. Senator Kyl's
hope so far has not been fulfilled.
There is also a statutory limit available to the USPTO until Sept.
16, 2016, that could provide PTAB with a means of slowing the
deluge. According to AIA SEC. 6(c)(2)(B), the limit on IPRs that
may be instituted in one year would be 530.177 To date, the Director
has not imposed a limit.
178
Senator Kyl noted this statutory limit that may be invoked, and
also that it was expected the USPTO regulations would provide a
"safety valve" if PTAB's ability to meet the statutory deadlines of
IPRs was threatened:
allow the Director to place a limit on the number of post-
grant and inter partes reviews that will be instituted during
the first four years that the proceedings are in effect. It is
understood that if the Office rejects a petition during this
period because of this numerical limit, it will make clear
176 157 CONG. REC. S1375 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
177 American Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 288 (2011) (codified at 35
U.S.C. 319(c)(2)(B)), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/stats/inter-parte-historical stats roll-upEOY2013.pdf
[http://perma.cc/7K6J-4P9Y] ("(B) GRADUATED IMPLEMENTATION. -The
Director may impose a limit on the number of inter partes reviews that may be
instituted under chapter 31 of title 35, United States Code, during each of the first 4 1-
year periods in which the amendments made by subsection (a) are in effect, if such
number in each year equals or exceeds the number of inter partes reexaminations that
are ordered under chapter 31 of title 35, United States Code, in the last fiscal year
ending before the effective date of the amendments made by subsection (a).").
178 See id.
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that the rejection was made because of this limit and not on
the merits of the validity challenges presented in the
petition. Similarly, under subsection (a)(2) of sections 316
and 326, the Office is required to implement the inter
partes and post-grant review thresholds via regulations,
and under subsection (b) of those sections, in prescribing
regulations, the Office is required to take into account,
among other things, the Office's ability "to timely
complete proceedings instituted under" those chapters. It
is expected that the Office will include in the threshold
regulations a safety valve that allows the Office to decline
to institute further proceedings if a high volume of pending
proceedings threatens the Office's ability to timely
complete all proceedings.
The present bill's inclusion of this regulations
consideration in subsection (b) reflects a legislative
judgment that it is better that the Office turn away some
petitions that otherwise satisfy the threshold for instituting
an inter partes or post-grant review than it is to allow the
Office to develop a backlog of instituted reviews that
precludes the Office from timely completing all
proceedings.179 (emphasis added)
D. CAFC appeal decisions start to come down reversing PTAB
final written decisions of unpatentability
If the Federal Circuit started overturning PTAB decisions, there
could be an increase in the number of challenged claims surviving
IPR. The Federal Circuit would effectively be telling PTAB that they
are wrong in their interpretation of the statute.
So far, however, the Federal Circuit is primarily using Rule 36
opinions to affirm PTAB final written decisions. As of Nov. 1, 2015,
there are very few substantive precedential decisions. Two of note are
In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC, 793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir.
2015), and Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292 (Fed.
Cir. 2015). In Cuozzo, the first substantive decision on an appeal of a
PTAB IPR final written decisions, the Federal Circuit affirmed
PTAB's decision in its entirety, including the non-appealability of an
IPR institution decision, the finding of unpatentability of all instituted
claims, and the denial of Cuozzo's motion to amend. In Microsoft, the
179 157 CONG. REC. S1377 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
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Federal Circuit for the first time partially vacated PTAB's decision
and remanded the case. This remand raises a whole new series of
procedural and substantive questions as there is nothing in the statute
about what happens to a case on remand to PTAB.
V. CONCLUSION
The first three years of AIA IPRs have been much worse to
Patent Owners than many anticipated. The provisions that were
perhaps intended to be Patent Owner-friendly have not in fact turned
out to be much protection at all. It remains to be seen if corrective
action will be taken or if PTAB starts to issue more denials as a
gatekeeper for controlling its workload.
